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WHO BUYS WHAT? HOW INTEGRATION CAPABILITY AFFECTS ACQUISITION 
INCIDENCE AND TARGET CHOICE 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Firms differ in their integration capability, which is the ability to absorb and manage 
businesses on a continuing basis.  We expect integration capability heterogeneity to influence 
acquisition strategy by profit-seeking firms, affecting both their propensity to acquire and the 
types of businesses that they target. We argue that a firm’s integration capability increases with 
its product line scope and test two hypotheses: (1) firms with greater existing product line scope 
are more likely to be acquirers; and (2) firms with greater product line scope are more likely to 
purchase product lines that they already operate. Data from the U.S. medical sector between 
1978 and 1995 support hypothesis 1. We then find that all firms tended to purchase product lines 
that they did not previously operate, but, consistent with hypothesis 2, that firms with greater 
product line scope made acquisitions that had greater overlap with their existing product lines. 
The results are analogous with the biological observation that the most successful predators are 
better able to target desirable prey as well as being better able to overpower the prey they target. 
  1
WHO BUYS WHAT? HOW INTEGRATION CAPABILITY AFFECTS ACQUISITION 
INCIDENCE AND TARGET CHOICE 
 
Recent research argues that firms differ in integration capability, which is the ability to 
absorb and manage business resources on a continuing basis (e.g., Jemison and Sitkin, 1986; 
Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Collis and Montgomery, 1998; Helfat and Raubitschek, 2000). 
This idea, however, has received only initial conceptual development and little empirical 
attention. In this paper we argue that the concept of integration capability helps explain 
differences among firms’ acquisition strategies, because integration is an important component in 
the expected value of acquisition outcomes. We investigate two related issues that arise from 
differences in integration capability as it relates to acquisition strategy choices. The first issue is 
which firms become acquirers. The second is, given that firms become acquirers, do they 
purchase product lines that they already operate or product lines they do not operate.  
Using a routine-based perspective and focusing on business-level acquisition activities,
1 
we argue that firms with greater numbers of product lines possess greater integration capabilities. 
We develop two hypotheses. First, we predict that firms with greater existing product line scope 
(i.e., operate more product lines within a business) are more likely to be acquirers than firms 
with fewer product lines, because they have greater ability to absorb and integrate acquired lines 
of business on an ongoing basis. Second, we hypothesize that acquirers that operate more 
product lines ex ante are more likely to purchase product lines that they currently operate. Our 
reasoning is that these firms have greater ability to undertake the intensive integration that such 
purchases often require. 
Our research adds to the growing stream of research on how firm capabilities influence 
what firms do, which is necessary to examine if we want to understand how capabilities 
influence performance. For example, the existing literature argues that integration efforts are key 
in successfully determining the outcome of an acquisition (e.g., Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; 
Jemison and Sitkin, 1986). We agree with this relationship, but argue further that the ability to 
integrate operations influences whether or not a firm undertakes acquisitions and given that they 
do, what they choose to acquire, because the integration ability affects their expected return of 
undertaking acquisitions. Understanding such self-selection of strategy choice is important when 
assessing strategy outcomes and providing guidance to managers (Masten, 1993; Shaver, 1998).  
We test our hypotheses by examining almost 2,600 firms operating in the U.S. medical  2
sector during the period of 1978 to 1995. The data include 271 acquisitions, including a total of 
about 900 product lines at the target businesses. This empirical setting is particularly well suited 
to inform how firm differences affect acquisition strategy choices. The data capture a varied 
sample that is close to the population of firms and acquisition activities in this sector and allow 
us to measure the different product lines that firms offer with an unusually high degree of 
precision. The product lines represent a moderate degree of product-market relatedness, as most 
firms operate lines that fall within the equivalent of one to three two-digit SIC classifications 
(mainly those encompassing medical devices, medical services, or  pharmaceuticals). Therefore, 
we can make detailed assessments of the businesses that each firm operates and acquires within a 
market sector. We believe that the results generalize to competitive market settings that have 
substantial diversity of customer demands and in which substantial technical variety underlies 
the goods and services that firms provide to meet those demands. 
The analysis supports the hypothesis that firms with larger numbers of product lines ex 
ante are more likely to be acquirers. In turn, we find that all acquirers commonly purchase 
product lines that they did not previously operate. Pushing further, the results then show that 
although all acquirers tend to extend into new product lines, the extent to which they purchase 
firms that also tie into their existing product offerings increases with product line scope. Thus, 
our results suggest that firms with greater integration capabilities make acquisitions that expand 
their product line offerings yet also provide more overlap with their existing product lines. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section details our hypotheses. The following 
section describes the data and the empirical estimation approach. The subsequent section 
presents the results. The final section discusses the implications that our findings have for better 
understanding acquisition strategies and acquisition outcomes. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
We use a routine-based perspective on business dynamics as the theoretical basis for our 
study (Karim and Mitchell, 2000). The routine-based perspective draws most directly on work 
from the resource-based view of strategy (Penrose, 1959) and behavioral and evolutionary views 
of the firm (Cyert and March, 1962; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), 
along with key ideas from ecological (Hannan and Freeman, 1984) and transaction cost theories 
(Williamson 1999). Routines are identifiable patterns of activity embodied in human or capital 
assets (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Dosi, Marengo, and Fagiolo, 1996; Winter, 1990). Routines  3
consist of multiple related transactions that take place over time either within a firm or via 
interaction with external parties. Routines are often tacit, either because they are intrinsically 
uncodifiable or because they require the interactive participation of multiple people. Several 
routines combine together to create particular resources. Resources, which we view as 
synonymous with the term capabilities, are stocks of knowledge, skills, financial assets, physical 
assets, human capital, and other tangible and intangible factors (Wernerfelt, 1984; Amit and 
Schoemaker, 1993).  
Two important considerations arise when applying a routine-based perspective. The first 
relates to unit of analysis. The perspective argues than the sum of the components that comprise 
capabilities are greater than their individual effects. Therefore, it is important to choose a unit of 
analysis and manifestation of the theoretical construct that captures the aggregated capability. If 
we were to focus on components or processes that form a capability, we would not only be 
examining a different unit of analysis from which our theory is based, but we would also 
overlook important ways in which the components of a capability form an effect greater that 
their individual effects. Given our empirical setting, we will focus on product lines as indicators 
of integration capabilities, which we elaborate later. 
The question of unit of analysis, in turn, gives rise to a second consideration. When we 
focus on the more aggregated construct of capabilities, it is possible that what we identify as a 
capability might reflect routines other than the ones that we argue drive the relationship. This 
highlights an important implication when applying our theoretical perspective. We would mask 
an important aspect of the theoretical perspective (i.e., sum greater than the parts), if we focused 
on the components. Yet we introduce the possibility for alternative interpretations by focusing on 
capabilities. Therefore, to effectively apply this theoretical lens, we must explicitly consider 
alternative explanations, both theoretically and empirically. As a result, we hypothesize 
relationships between firm capabilities and acquisition strategy choices, yet we consider other 
factors that could drive the predicted results and identify ways in which the tests favour our 
interpretation.  
Turning to our arguments, we expect that an important determinant of whether a firm 
engages in acquisitions is its ability to absorb and manage product lines on a continuing basis. 
This ability is becoming known in the literature as a firm’s integration capability. Integration is a 
firm-level or business sector-level capability because it involves the balancing of more than one  4
product line on an ongoing basis. Therefore, in keeping with our previous description, this 
capability, rather than its components, is the focus of our hypothesis generation. 
Integration capability is an important determinant of acquisition strategies that is distinct 
from the resources involved in the underlying creation, production, and sale of a product. The 
concept of an integration capability arises in the literature in disparate ways. Helfat and 
Raubitschek (2000: 964) argue that integrative knowledge, which they define as “knowledge that 
integrates, or knowledge of how to integrate, different activities, capabilities, and products in one 
or more vertical chains,” is an important element in the co-evolution of capabilities and products. 
Collis and Montgomery (1998) argue that important elements to corporate advantage include not 
only the resources that determine what products a corporation offers, but also the corporation’s 
coordination and control capabilities. 
In the merger and acquisition context, Singh and Zollo (1997) argue that firms can 
develop post-acquisition management skills that facilitate their use of acquisitions. The 
conceptual literature on acquisition process, meanwhile, argues that firms differ in their abilities 
to plan and implement post-acquisition target integration, where integration requires momentum 
and inter-group coordination (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986). Moreover, judgment is required in 
matching the appropriate level or type of integration activities to a particular acquisition (e.g., 
Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Pablo, 1994). Recently, a few empirical working papers have 
focused on the mechanisms through which firm can attain integration capabilities. Zollo and 
Singh (2000) and Zollo and Leshchinskii (2000) argue that integration capability involves two 
mechanisms – tacit routinization for repetitive tasks and explicit codification for relatively 
infrequent and complex tasks. Similarly, Puranam (2001) finds that firms can develop an 
integration capability that facilitates acquisition transactions.  
We highlight the ongoing and recurring nature of integration that is central to these 
arguments. In the Helfat and Raubitschek (2000) approach, integrative knowledge works in a 
continuous feedback system with core knowledge, product sequencing, incremental learning, and 
step-function learning. Similarly, in other approaches, coordination and control are ongoing 
processes that help facilitate management of a system of interdependent parts. In a 
complementary discussion, meanwhile, Liebeskind (1996) notes that firms differ in their internal 
capabilities to safeguard their knowledge, which typically requires the ability to integrate various 
activities over time. Lubatkin, Schulze, Mainkar, and Cotterill (2001:353) note how it took “at  5
least three years” for performance differences to become apparent between the products in the 
Nestlé/Carnation merger versus the RJR/Nabisco merger and that these differences persisted 
over time. Thus, in our view, integration capabilities involve more than that a one-time action 
related to a specific acquisition. Rather, integration capabilities facilitate actions immediately 
after an acquisition and then into the future. 
We predict that integration capability is an important consideration for the acquisition of 
product lines, regardless of whether the acquired lines constitute existing or new products for the 
acquirer.
2 Consider when a firm acquires a product line in which it already operates. Common 
profit-seeking motivations for making such an acquisition would be trying to increase market 
power and searching for efficiencies by combining acquired resources in order to achieve greater 
scale (e.g., Seth, 1990). In the market power case, integration efforts are necessary to coordinate 
the production, marketing, and pricing efforts of the two firms in order to realize any market 
power advantages. To achieve efficiency gains, meanwhile, the acquirer must integrate the 
operations of the original business and target firm. Therefore, under both motivations, integration 
efforts play an important role in facilitating acquisitions, both upon completion of the acquisition 
and in an ongoing basis. For instance, Capron, Dussauge and Mitchell (1998) show that a 
significant redeployment of assets in both directions commonly occurs for several years 
following horizontal acquisitions, suggesting the importance of integration capabilities in 
horizontal combinations. 
The importance of integration capabilities also arises with the acquisition of product lines 
that are new to a firm. Again, efficiency or market power motivations are relevant when 
acquisitions involve non-overlapping product lines. For example, firms might be trying to 
capture efficiencies in development, manufacturing, or marketing across shared portions of the 
value chain. Likewise, the goal of acquiring new product lines might be to capture monopoly 
rents at some point in the value chain. In addition, such acquisitions offer opportunities to 
innovate by recombining the acquired lines with other lines in order to produce new goods and 
services. Such recombination will require substantial integration and reshaping of existing and 
new product lines (Capron, Mitchell, Swaminathan, 2001).  
Operationally, we expect integration capabilities to associate with the number of product 
lines that a firm operates prior to making an acquisition. This association arises because firms 
that operate more product lines tend to have the organization structure, operating procedures, and  6
skills to effectively integrate their multiple product offerings. Again, consistent with our 
theoretical perspective, this operationalization has the benefit of being able to capture the 
culmination of many routines versus the reductionist problems that would arise had we focused 
on any one component. Moreover, we note how this relationship describes the on-going nature of 
integration.  
Theoretical and empirical arguments support this measure. For example, Chandler (1962) 
argues that multi-activity firms develop capabilities to manage their extensive operations. Such 
capabilities result from the combination of organization structure, operating systems, and 
managerial expertise (Penrose, 1959). Barnett and Freeman (1997) argue that the variety of a 
firm’s production and coordinating routines will increase with the number of product lines it 
offers. Kekre and Srinivasan (1990) and Lancaster (1990) show that the ability to manage 
disparate activities increases with the number of product lines that a firm offers. Consistent with 
these arguments, Karim and Mitchell (2000) show that post-acquisition product line retention 
increases with the number of lines that an acquirer possesses. We discuss below how our data 
and variables make this operationalization especially relevant in our empirical setting. 
In summary, we hypothesize that firms with higher levels of integration capabilities will 
be more likely to engage in acquisitions than firms lacking these capabilities. This result obtains 
because these firms are better able to assess the appropriate level of integration needed for a 
particular acquisition and then to implement the acquisition – immediately and into the future. In 
turn, the number of product lines that a firm operates manifests such integration capabilities.  
Hypothesis 1. The greater the number of product lines that a firm operates, the more 
likely the firm is to become an acquirer in a given period.  
We consider three alternative explanations with respect to this hypothesis. First, we test 
for prior acquisition activity. We formulated the hypothesis on the argument that firms with 
greater integration capability will be more likely to engage in acquisitions. This argument differs 
from the predictions that firms engage in acquisitions because they have greater acquisition skills 
or because they have acquisition momentum. This distinction is important from both a theoretical 
and measurement perspective. Theoretically, we expect integration capabilities to create benefits 
for firm activities other than acquisitions. For example, we expect that internal development of 
new product lines also needs integration capability (e.g., Rind, 1981). Firms that successfully 
develop products internally have to integrate the development and launch of these products  7
within the firm, sharing resources in some cases and potentially cannibalizing product lines in 
other cases. From a measurement perspective, this indicates that our focus on product lines 
versus previous merger activity is a more valid measure of the underlying construct. 
Nevertheless, because acquisition activity often associates with adding product lines, we must 
explicitly control for prior acquisition activity in order to test our hypothesis. 
Second, we consider agency motivations for acquisitions. The assumption of profit-
seeking managerial intended rationality underlies our arguments. That is, we expect managers to 
be more likely to undertake extensive acquisition activity if they believe that their firms have the 
integration skills needed to complete the acquisitions effectively. We recognize that acquisition 
activity sometimes stems from motivations that differ from the goal to increase firm profitability, 
such as empire building, (e.g., Jensen, 1986), hubris (e.g., Roll, 1986), or other agency 
motivations (e.g., Amihud and Lev, 1981). Nonetheless, the existence of these motivations does 
not invalidate our arguments. First, even self-serving managers rarely ‘advertise’ that they are 
making acquisitions for agency reasons and, instead, have incentives to engage in actions that 
make it appear an acquisition did not occur solely for personal gain. These actions include efforts 
to integrate the acquired company. The ability to do so will depend on integration capabilities. 
Thus, even acquisitions that stem in part from agency motives will be more feasible in firms that 
have strong integration capabilities. Second, all else equal, we expect that analysts will scrutinize 
acquisitions more carefully when made by companies that lack integration capabilities, in order 
to verify that they are not made for agency reasons. Under this condition, our prediction will still 
hold. Namely, firms lacking integration capabilities will be less likely to make acquisitions 
compared to firms that possess such capabilities. Nevertheless, to the extent that these 
explanations for acquisition activity are pervasive and external monitoring does not pay heed to 
integration capabilities, the data will reject our hypotheses, so that any bias is conservative. We 
further discuss agency motivations when we interpret the results.  
Third, we consider the literature on divestitures. This literature has introduced similar 
measures to our measure of integration capability, which is the number of product lines, as 
measures of over-diversification or high governance costs (e.g., Hitt, Hoskisson, Johnson and 
Moesel, 1996; Markides, 1992; Bergh and Lawless, 1998). The argument of these studies is that 
firms with excess levels of diversification will be more likely to spin off business or see 
increased value when they spin off businesses. To the extent that greater numbers of product  8
lines represent over-diversification, we will not find support for our hypothesis because the 
existing literature finds that over-diversified firms are more likely to contract than expand. 
Nonetheless, there is not a one-to-one mapping between the over-diversification literature and 
our study because, as we discuss shortly, we measure product lines at a much more refined level 
than these studies, which tend to use business segments or four-digit SIC codes.  
Moreover, even to the extent that our measures complement the over-diversification 
measures, we expect somewhat different results. The traditional value-producing divestiture 
arguments stem from the implicit or explicit assumption that firms have mistakenly over-
expanded. By contrast, though, value-producing divestiture of unneeded product lines may 
actually result from acquisition activity and be a part of a firm’s integration capability. Capron, 
Mitchell, and Swaminathan (2001) suggest that asset divestiture, especially post-acquisition, is 
part of an active program of business reconfiguration in which firms often acquire resources that 
they do not need along with resources that they do need if they use acquisitions to make changes 
(in addition, a firm’s traditional resources may become obsolete when it acquires new resources). 
In this way, firms use resource divestiture when they change their degree of diversification as a 
way of ensuring that they do not reach unmanageable levels of diversification. Therefore, our 
prediction is consistent with an argument that firms with many product lines will benefit from 
divesting excess lines, although for a different reason than the original argument that firms have 
over-expanded. Instead, our approach highlights the idea that firms can adjust their overall level 
of diversification by adding and subtracting product lines during the acquisition and integration 
processes. 
Turning to the second hypothesis, we examine what determines whether firms tend to 
acquire product lines that they operated prior to the acquisition (existing lines) or product lines 
that they did not previously operate (new lines). Above, we argued that integration capabilities 
are important whether a firm acquires a new line or whether it acquires a product line it operated 
ex ante. The following arguments refine this argument. We reason that integration capabilities 
will be most important when a firm acquires product lines that it already operated prior to the 
acquisition, due to the intensity of integration that is required for overlapping versus non-
overlapping lines. 
We start by considering the degree of overlap of an acquirer’s existing business with 
acquired lines that it did or did not operate previously. It is useful to consider a  9
commercialization value chain that includes development, production, marketing, distribution, 
and administrative activities. Typically, there will be more overlap in the marketing and 
distribution aspects of the value chain when an acquirer purchases a product line that it already 
operates than when it acquires a new product line. We cannot predict whether there will be more 
or less overlap in development or production capabilities when firms acquire product lines that 
they do and do not operate ex ante, however, because different products often rely on similar 
technologies and manufacturing processes,
3 while substitutable product offerings can draw on 
different technologies and manufacturing processes. Nor can we predict whether administrative 
activities will have greater or lesser overlap in the two types of cases. Nonetheless, so long as 
there is on average no greater overlap of capabilities in development, production, and 
administrative functions for new product lines than for existing lines, then even a conservative 
argument suggests that acquisitions of new lines will have less overlap with the acquirer’s 
existing capabilities owing to the lesser overlap in marketing and distribution.  
When one considers the use of integration capabilities, it is necessary to consider both the 
difficulty of integrating newly acquired product lines and the intensity of integration that an 
acquirer will need to undertake. Integration of lines that the acquirer already offers and lines that 
the acquirer did not operate before the acquisition will tend to vary on these two dimensions, of 
relative difficulty and intensity. 
Consider acquiring lines that a firm did not operate before the acquisition. A firm would 
often face substantial difficulties if it were to undertake full-scale integration of such lines. Full 
integration often would require combining newly-acquired business units with existing business 
units that would tend to have highly different attributes and then adapting many types of business 
activities – including development, production, marketing, distribution, and administrative 
systems – in order to fully integrate the new lines into the existing business.  
Nonetheless, adding new product lines typically does not require full-scale integration for 
the acquirer to obtain value. Although obtaining value from the acquisition will require some 
degree of business integration, the integration often occurs in more focused areas in the value 
chain compared to acquisitions of existing lines. For instance, if cross-selling products is the 
potential benefit of acquiring a new product line, then only limited business integration would be 
required. Similarly, if the expected benefit of acquiring a new line is the opportunity to learn 
about a new market segment or a new technology, then a firm may need to undertake only  10
limited integration to obtain value from the target. In such cases, newly acquired business units 
may well continue to operate as stand-alone subsidiaries, with only partial integration of 
activities such as marketing or development into the acquirer’s other businesses. Other business 
activities may not offer opportunities for more extensive integration, at least during the period in 
which a firm is simply cross-selling products and/or learning about the new business opportunity. 
Thus, although full-scale integration of new lines would be difficult, so that it might seem that 
firms would need greater prevalence of integration capabilities in order to undertake acquisitions 
that emphasized new lines, the need for immediate integration is often limited. Therefore, 
acquirers often have only to undertake light-handed integration of the new lines with their 
existing businesses and they may be able to undertake successful acquisitions even if they lack a 
high degree of integration capability. 
By contrast, consider the integration of acquired lines that a firm already operates. When 
an acquirer buys a product line it already operates, there is by definition some overlap in the 
sales and marketing aspects of the value chain. Here, although the difficulty of integration might 
appear easier relative to new lines, the intensity of integration will tend to be greater. When a 
firm acquires lines that it already operates, much of the post-acquisition value will arise through 
increased economies of scale in development, production, marketing, distribution, and 
administration. In order to realize such scale economies, the acquirer will need to combine the 
acquired business unit with its existing business units and will need to consolidate many 
activities along the value chain. Moreover, the acquirer typically will need to undertake the 
integration quite quickly in order to recover the cost of the acquisition through increased 
efficiencies. In turn, the acquirer typically will need to divest resources that have become 
obsolete owing to the consolidation, where the divestitures will involve resources of both the 
target and existing businesses (Capron, et al., 2001). Such intense consolidation and 
rationalization requires substantial integration skill. The announcement in 2001 that Hewlett-
Packard intended to purchase Compaq, for instance, met substantial skepticism in the financial 
markets because of doubts that the firms had the integration skill that they would require in order 
to consolidate and rationalize their overlapping products lines effectively and quickly.  
Thus, we expect that the ongoing integration of existing lines will require greater 
integration capabilities than the integration of new lines because the firm will need to undertake 
more intense integration in order to realize the value of the acquisition. This argument parallels  11
arguments that firms need to undertake different levels or types of integration for different 
acquisitions (e.g., Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Pablo, 1994).  We hypothesize that a firm’s 
expectation of being able to undertake the appropriate level of integration will influence the 
extent to which it undertakes a certain type of acquisition. The following hypothesis follows 
from the assumption that greater product line scope reflects greater integration capabilities. 
Hypothesis 2. The larger an acquirer’s existing product line scope, the greater the firm’s 
tendency toward purchasing product lines it already operates. 
Turning to alternative explanations, we recognize that there is an underlying probabilistic 
relationship that appears to generate predictions that are consistent with this hypothesis. Namely, 
should a firm randomly purchase a product line, there is a higher probability that it purchases a 
line that it already operates, the more lines that it operated ex ante. We assess this alternative 
explanation in the discussion of the empirical findings, showing that it does not hold. 
In summary, the hypotheses address how an important source of firm heterogeneity – 
integration capability, which is the ability to integrate disparate business operations on an 
ongoing basis – affects the likelihood that profit-seeking firms will become acquirers and 
whether they will buy lines of business that they do or do not previously operate. We expect 
acquisition activity to increase with firms’ product line scope, owing to greater ability to 
integrate and manage target businesses. In turn, given that a firm becomes an acquirer, we 
predict that greater product line scope will lead to greater propensity to purchase product lines 
that the firm already operates. Thus, we expect that firms with the greatest integration 
capabilities will be most likely to make acquisitions and also will be more systematic in making 
acquisitions where they can best leverage these skills. This reasoning is analogous with the 
biological observation that the most successful predators are not only better able to overpower 
their prey, but are also better able to target prey against which they can most successfully employ 
their capabilities.  
DATA AND EMPIRICAL APPROACH  
We test the hypotheses by examining a sample of firms that approaches the population of 
companies that participated in the U.S. medical sector between 1978 and 1995. The data source 
that we use is The Medical and Healthcare Marketplace Guide (1975, 1978, 1983, 1986, 1989, 
and each year after until 1995). These guides identify virtually every firm of any appreciable size 
that was operating in the U.S. medical sector, including U.S.-owned and foreign-owned  12
businesses. The data source provides operating information for many privately held companies, 
for which other sources do not provide comparable data, as well as for publicly held 
corporations. The guides provide extensive information regarding the firms’ medical sector 
product lines. The guides identify 258 product lines from five sub-sectors: medical devices (184 
lines), dental devices (5 lines), ophthalmic devices (7 lines), pharmaceutical products (16 lines), 
and healthcare services (46 lines). These data provide unusually fine-grained information about 
firms’ acquisition activities. Karim and Mitchell (2000) use a related data set to examine a 
different set of issues).
4 
The product line definitions are precise, typically at a five to seven digit level with the 
U.S. Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system. For example, several medical device 
product lines fall within one four-digit SIC classification (3845 – Electro-medical and Electro-
therapeutic Apparatus). This precision is important given our arguments that product line scope 
measures integration capabilities. Our product definitions are able to pick up differences in 
markets, production technologies, and research base that are not identifiable in many other data. 
Overall, as we noted earlier, the lines represent a moderate degree of relatedness. To the 
extent that SIC classifications accurately represent product-market diversification, most of the 
lines fall within a few four-digit categories, all involving goods and services in medical sector 
market segments. There is greater diversity at the technical end of the spectrum, because the 
goods draw on a wide variety of biological, chemical, engineering, and service-based 
technologies. This range of diversity is similar to that which arises in many businesses organized 
in terms of their focal product markets, such as auto, aerospace, consumer packaged goods, 
financial services, and telecommunications. In this way, the setting is comparable to many 
mature market settings in which there are some highly focused competitors and other 
competitors with sufficient integration capabilities that their product lines have evolved to 
include a substantial range of complementary goods and services in multiple market segments. 
The diversity in the medical sector is somewhat broader than in highly focused markets, such as 
traditional consumer banking and petroleum refining. Even in such settings, though, we would 
expect similar results to those that we predict in this study, as long as there is market space for 
more than a very small number of highly specific product lines, because firms will need to 
develop effective integration capabilities in order to offer even a more limited set of goods and 
services than those available in the medical sector.  13
We construct the sample from all firms operating in 1978 and 1983 and then examine 
their acquisition activities through 1995. We focus on two years of baseline activity to increase 
the number of firms that we can examine. The sample includes 2,589 firms, with 1,211 firms that 
were operating in 1978 and an additional 1,378 firms that entered the data set by 1983. We focus 
on these years for two reasons. First, we choose 1978 as the base year because we were then able 
to use information from the 1975 guide to calculate control variables for ex ante business activity 
and industry growth. Second, focusing on these two baseline years provides a more consistent 
window over which to examine firm actions than if we include a greater number of years. 
Focal variables 
The first dependent variable that we examine is whether or not a firm becomes an 
acquirer during the study period. The variable, which we label ACQUIRER, takes the value of 1 
if a firm engaged in at least one acquisition from the beginning of the study period through 1995, 
zero otherwise. The Medical and Healthcare Marketplace Guide provided data to determine the 
value of this variable over various years. Of the 2,589 firms that form the sample, 216 engaged in 
acquisitions during the study period. Because some firms in our sample engaged in multiple 
acquisitions, the total number of acquisitions that we examine in the second stage of the analysis 
includes 271 acquisitions. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for all variables. 
********** Table 1 about here ********** 
We define three related variables to evaluate the extent to which acquired product lines 
matched a firm’s existing product lines. We label the variables NEW LINES, EXISTING 
LINES, and NET OVERLAP. NEW LINES records the number of acquired lines that do not 
match the existing product lines of the acquirer. EXISTING LINES records the number of 
acquired lines that match existing product lines of the acquirer. NET OVERLAP then subtracts 
NEW LINES from EXISTING LINES. Positive values of NET OVERLAP indicate that the 
acquirer purchased more product lines in which it operated than in which it did not operate. 
Negative values of NET OVERLAP indicate that the acquirer purchased more product lines in 
which it did not operate than in which it operated. The average value of NET OVERLAP is  
-1.47, which is significantly less than zero (p<0.0001). That is, on average, firms are purchasing 
approximately one and a half product lines in which they did not operate with each acquisition. 
The range of the NET OVERLAP variable is large, with a maximum value of 5 (more existing 
lines than new lines) and a minimum value of -24 (more new lines than existing lines).  14
To measure the product line scope of a company, which is the focal independent variable, 
we count the number of product lines that it operated prior to the acquisition. We label this 
variable NUMBER OF LINES. The average number of lines in which a company operates is 
2.25. The range is large. Some companies are very focused and operate only one line. By 
contrast, one company in our sample operated 43 lines in the baseline year.
5 
Control variables 
As we previously discussed, it is important to control for plausible alternative 
explanations when examining how product line scope relates to the dependent variables of 
interest. First, we measure the size of the company. Size is an important control given that we 
measure integration capabilities as the number of product lines that a firm operates and this 
variable might capture the impact of firm size. The variable SIZE records the company’s sales in 
the medical sector (millions of 1982 dollars based on the Producer Price Index).
6  
We also control for whether a firm entered the medical sector initially by acquisition. The 
variable ENTER THE SECTOR BY ACQUISITION takes the value 1 under this circumstance, 0 
otherwise. We include this control for three reasons. First, firms undoubtedly make acquisitions 
for reasons other than their integration capabilities. If a firm entered the sector by acquisition for 
one of these reasons and if the motivation still exists, then these firms will more likely be 
acquirers and this variable will capture this effect. In other words, this variable helps capture the 
existence of unobserved heterogeneity in determining the acquisition decision and provides 
additional confidence that the independent variables that we test capture their intended effect. 
Second, behavioral or inertial forces might create a momentum with respect to acquisition 
activity (Amburgey and Miner, 1992), which this control will also capture. Finally, to the extent 
that there is an experience effect that facilitates acquisitions (e.g., Fowler and Schmidt, 1989) 
controlling for entry into the sector by acquisition will help address this effect.  
We defined the variable PREVIOUS ACQUISITIONS as the number of medical sector 
acquisitions that the firm made prior to the base analysis year (i.e., 1978 or 1983). We identified 
these acquisitions by reviewing reports in the medical sector trade guides, which were the 
primary data source. These reports somewhat understate acquisitions, because they do not report 
all historical acquisitions that a firm has made, but they do report most or all recent medical 
sector acquisitions (within about five years of the base year), as well as notable older 
acquisitions. Thus, the variable provides a useful measure of a firm's most relevant acquisition  15
history and will aid in measuring experience and acquisition capability. We find that this variable 
correlates with NUMBER OF LINES, which suggests the importance of including it as a control 
because number of lines could pick up this effect. Given the correlation of these two variables, 
we investigated if the results that we present were driven by collinearity between these two 
variables. Sensitivity analyses suggested that this was not the case, because the results for each 
variable were robust to dropping the other variable.
7 
The next control that we include is whether the firm is based in the U.S. or in another 
country. We label this variable FOREIGN, which takes a value of 1 if the company is foreign-
owned, 0 if U.S.-owned. We include this control because the U.S. enjoys a comparative 
advantage in the medical sector compared to other nations and there is empirical evidence that 
foreign firms often acquire firms in a foreign country in order to gain access to capabilities that 
they might lack (e.g., Kogut and Chang, 1991). We gather the nationality data from The Medical 
and Healthcare Marketplace Guide and other secondary sources. Of the 2,589 observations, 
approximately eight percent are foreign-owned. 
We also include a variable to control for the effect of competition. To measure the 
variable COMPETITORS, we calculate the number of companies that operate in each firm’s 
product lines. For companies that operate in more that one product line, we average the values 
across lines. Table 1 indicates that the companies in the sample faced as few as one competitor 
and as many as 182 competitors.  
********** Table 1 about here ********** 
Finally, we control for market growth in the product lines that a firm operates. We 
measure the change in the number of firms that participated in a product line in the previous 
period (i.e., the change in the variable COMPETITORS).
8 For firms that operate in multiple 
product lines, we average the number of competitors in each line to create the variable 
PRODUCT LINE GROWTH. In our sample, we observe that some companies operate in 
product lines where the number of participants is contracting; the minimum value of this variable 
is -0.44. We also observe that many companies are participating in product lines that are 
growing; the mean value for the PRODUCT LINE GROWTH variable is 2.81 and the maximum 
value is 20.2. This positive mean growth level is consistent with the overall growth of the 
healthcare sector during this period.  16
Statistical Approach 
We have two dependent variables of interest: whether or not a firm becomes an acquirer 
and the degree to which it purchases product lines that it already operated. Given that we only 
observe the latter dependent variable for the set of firms that chose to make acquisitions, we 
follow Heckman’s (1979) two-stage sample selection estimation approach. This approach 
explicitly recognizes the conditional nature of the comparison in the second stage, thus allowing 
for more meaningful interpretation of the coefficient estimates. Shaver (1998) provides a more 
complete description of the benefits in using such techniques in strategy research. 
Conceptually, one can think of the investigation in the following manner. Firms assess 
the expected value of engaging or not engaging in acquisitions. We can define a variable 
ACQUIRER* as the difference in expected value of engaging in acquisitions versus not 
engaging in acquisitions. As researchers, we cannot observe or measure the value of 
ACQUIRER*, but we can infer that it is greater than zero by observing whether or not firms 
undertake acquisitions. This is the standard formulation of a dichotomous choice model, which 
equation 1 represents. 
 ACQUIRER*i = γγγγ′ ′′ ′ wi + ui 
ACQUIRER i = 1 if ACQUIRER*i > 0, 0 otherwise     [1] 
We expect that the underlying expected value of acquisitions is a function of several variables 
based on our hypothesis and controls that form the vector w. Moreover, effects that we do not 
hypothesize or control for in w are captured by an error term, which we label u and assume has a 
normal distribution. The normality assumption results in a probit specification for the 
dichotomous choice model. Therefore, we test hypotheses 1 with a probit specification. 
Hypothesis 2 examines how product line scope affects NET OVERLAP. The standard 
one-stage approach would be to estimate a regression model of the following form. 
NET OVERLAP = ββββ′ ′′ ′ xi + ε i       [2] 
Because we observe NET OVERLAP only for firms that make acquisitions, we are concerned 
that the conditionality of the relationship might lead to misleading estimates of ββββ  in the one-stage 
regression. In particular, this will occur if unmeasurable or unknown factors affect both decisions 
to become acquirers and the degree of overlap of the businesses that firms acquire. Under this 
condition, the estimates of ββββ  will not have desirable statistical properties because the error terms 
in equations 1 and 2 correlate and there exists the possibility that a measured variable in xi  17
correlates with an unmeasured variable. Therefore, ββββ  could possibly capture the effect of an 
unmeasured variable rather than the variable included in xi. Heckman’s approach is to control for 
the potential correlation of the error terms by adding a term into the model in equation 2 that 
accounts for the correlation in error terms across equations, and then to correct the standard 
errors to account for heteroskedastasticity. This mitigates the possibility that ββββ  captures an 
unmeasured effect rather than the effect of xi. We estimate a model of the form: 
NET OVERLAP = ββββ′ ′′ ′ xi + β λ λ  + η      [3] 
where λ = φ (γγγγ′ ′′ ′ wi)/Φ (γγγγ′ ′′ ′ wi).  
In equation 3, φ  and Φ  are the probability density function and cumulative distribution function 
of the standard normal distribution. η  is an error term with zero mean, but it is heteroskedastic 
and not normally distributed. The correction of the standard errors accounts for the existence of 
heteroskedastasticity in the error term to create asymptotically efficient standard errors 
(Heckman, 1979; Greene, 2000). 
RESULTS 
Table 2 presents the results from the first stage probit specification. The results support 
hypothesis 1, which predicted that firms with greater product line scope are more likely to 
become acquirers. As we expected, the coefficient estimate of NUMBER OF LINES is positive 
and significant. Because probit is a non-linear estimator, the coefficient estimates do not convey 
marginal effects, which depend on the values of the independent variables. The table reports that 
the magnitude of the marginal effect at the mean of the independent variables is just over one 
percent. This indicates that for each additional product line, firms are one percent more likely to 
become acquirers. The standard deviation of NUMBER OF LINES is approximately 3; therefore, 
a one standard deviation increase from the mean of the independent variable increases the 
chances that a firm engages in acquisitions by over three percent. The magnitude of this effect is 
meaningful, considering that just over eight percent of the sample firms engage in acquisitions. 
********** Table 2 about here ********** 
Turning to the control variables, we observe that four of the six coefficient estimates are 
significant. First, the positive and significant coefficient estimate of SIZE indicates that larger 
firms tend to become acquirers. Controlling for size provides us with additional confidence that 
the NUMBER OF LINES variable captures the scope of a firm’s activities, which is the 
foundation of our hypothesis, rather than simply being an effect of firm size. The magnitude of  18
the marginal effect is quite small in that a firm of mean size is just over one tenth of one percent 
more likely to become an acquirer compared to a firm with negligible sales. 
Second, we found a positive and significant estimate of ENTER THE SECTOR BY 
ACQUISITION. The marginal effect is large. Firms that entered the medical sector by 
acquisition are fifteen percent more likely to engage in acquisitions compared to firms that did 
not enter the sector by acquisition. Because this variable might proxy for the existence of 
unmeasured effects that increase the propensity to acquire, the positive and significant 
coefficient estimate is expected. Moreover, the inclusion of this control increases the confidence 
that NUMBER OF LINES captures the underlying hypothesized effect. 
Third, the coefficient of PREVIOUS ACQUISITIONS is positive and significant. The 
marginal effect is such that for each acquisition prior to our time period, firms are two percent 
more likely to be an acquirer. Because the standard deviation of this variable is 1.62, a one 
standard deviation increase results in a three percent increase in the likelihood that a firm is an 
acquirer. Thus, while this effect is important, it is smaller than that of the predicted variable. 
Fourth, we find that foreign-owned companies are more likely to engage in acquisitions 
than U.S.-owned companies, as evidenced by the positive and significant coefficient estimate of 
FOREIGN. We find that at the mean level of the set of independent variables, foreign-owned 
firms are five percent more likely to engage in acquisitions compared to domestic firms. This is 
consistent with our expectation that the comparative advantage of the U.S. medical sector leads 
foreign firms to engage in acquisitions in order to access capabilities that reside in firms that 
operate in the U.S. 
Finally, we find no evidence that greater number of competitors or greater entry into a 
firm’s product lines affected its propensity to engage in acquisitions. That is, the coefficient 
estimates of COMPETITORS and PRODUCT LINE GROWTH are insignificant (in sensitivity 
analyses, we also found that each effect was insignificant when we omitted the other variable). 
Table 3 reports the results with respect to whether or not firms buy product lines that they 
operated ex ante (Hypothesis 2). We estimate three models: first examining net overlap of new 
and existing lines, then individually examining the number of new lines and existing lines that 
the firms acquired. 
********** Table 3 about here ********** 
In column 1 of Table 3, NET OVERLAP serves as the dependent variable. We also  19
include the square of NUMBER OF LINES as an independent variable, to check the possibility 
of a non-linear relationship. Overall, the fit of model 1 is poor. The R
2 is low (0.02) and the F-
test is non-significant, indicating that the independent variables add little explanatory power 
beyond the intercept. Consistent with the variable means in Table 1, this suggests that, on 
average, all acquirers purchase product lines that they did not previously operate.  
The results in column 1 of Table 3 do not support hypothesis 2, which predicted that 
firms with greater product line scope are more likely to purchase product lines that they already 
operate. The coefficient estimates of NUMBER OF LINES and its square are not significant. 
Sensitivity analyses that dropped the squared term also showed no significant effect with respect 
to NUMBER OF LINES (neither the raw value of the variable nor the log of the variable). 
Together, these results suggest that product line scope does not provide a discriminating 
influence on the net extent to which firms purchase new and existing product lines.  
In addition to the non-significant effect of the NUMBER OF LINES, none of the other 
control variables or the selection correction coefficient in column 1 of Table 3 has a significant 
coefficient estimate. Non-significant coefficient estimates of the selection correction are 
sometimes difficult to interpret. One interpretation is that a selection effect does not exist. 
Another possibility is that the effect exists, but the variable λ  correlates with other independent 
variables such that the resulting multicollinearity inflates the variance of the selection coefficient 
estimate and drives the non-significant finding. However, multicollinearity would not reduce the 
overall F-statistic. Because the overall F-test of model 1 is non-significant, we can rule out the 
multicolinearity explanation and interpret the non-significance of the coefficient estimate as the 
lack of a selection effect in column 1. 
To further investigate which product lines firms acquire, we break NET OVERLAP into 
its components, NEW LINES and EXISTING LINES. As we noted earlier, NEW LINES 
measures the number of lines that a target possessed that the acquirer did not possess before the 
acquisition. In parallel, the EXISTING LINES variable records the number of lines that a firm 
and its target shared at the time of the acquisition. The value of this refined analysis is that it 
allows us to focus directly on firms’ choices to purchase product lines that they already operate 
and that they do not already operate, rather than pooling the choices into an aggregate tendency 
as the NET OVERLAP variable does. Again we use the sample selection approach to account for 
the fact that we only observe the dependent variables if a firm engages in an acquisition.
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NEW LINES is the dependent variable in column 2 of Table 3. As in the first column, the 
F-test is non-significant, indicating that, beyond the intercept, the independent variables add little 
explanatory power. The intercept, which takes the value of 3.24 is significantly different from 
zero. The overall non-significance of the model combined with the significance of the intercept 
and the empirical observation from the data that firms, on average, acquire about 2.3 lines of 
business that they do not previously operate, suggests that firms with many characteristics that 
undertake acquisitions often do so in order to add new product lines. The main discrimination, 
then, lies in which firms undertake acquisitions, which Table 2 showed to be firms with greater 
integration capabilities, rather than in which firms use acquisitions to acquire new lines. 
None of the independent variables in column 2 of Table 3 is statistically significant. In 
particular, we find that the coefficient estimates of NUMBER OF LINES and its square have no 
effect on acquisition of NEW LINES. We also found that NUMBER OF LINES had no effect 
when we removed the squared term from the specification.  
By contrast, significant influences do emerge in column 3 of Table 3, where EXISTING 
LINES is the dependent variable. Here, we find that the model is statistically significant, based 
on the F-test. The coefficient estimate of NUMBER OF LINES is positive and significant. In 
addition, the coefficient estimate of NUMBER OF LINES
2 is negative and significant 
(Sensitivity analyses that omit the squared term indicate a positive and significant effect of 
NUMBER OF LINES, which is consistent with the positive correlation between NUMBER OF 
LINES and EXISTING LINES in Table 1). Together, these estimates indicate that EXISTING 
LINES increases with number of lines but at a decreasing rate. 
An alternative explanation that might at first seem appealing is that the positive impact of 
NUMBER OF LINES on acquiring EXISTING LINES in column 3 simply reflects an 
underlying probabilistic arithmetic relationship, as we noted earlier. The concern is that because 
the number of product lines as defined by our data source is fixed, the more product lines that an 
acquirer operates, the greater the probability that it purchases one that overlaps by chance. 
However, two observations in Table 3 help rule out the probabilistic explanation.  
First, the probabilistic relationship would be linear. Namely, if a firm operates one 
product line and randomly buys into a product line the chance of overlap is 1/258; if a firm 
operates two product lines, the chance of random overlap is 2/258; and so forth, until the extreme 
at which a firm that operates 257 product lines and randomly buys into a product line has a  21
257/258 chance of overlap (i.e., 257 times the chance when a firm has a single line). By contrast, 
we observe a non-linear relationship in column 3, because the non-monotonic relationship we 
observe between NUMBER OF LINES and EXISTING LINES is increasing, but at decreasing 
rate.   
Second, a probabilistic relationship should also hold for purchasing new lines. That is, the 
more product lines a firm has, the less likely by chance it would be to purchase into a product 
line that it does not currently operate. If an arithmetic relationship drove the results, then, we 
would expect NEW LINES to decrease as NUMBER OF LINES increases in column 2. Thus, 
the null results in column 2 provide further reassurance that the relationships are not simply 
arithmetic. Therefore, the evidence suggests that our results do not reflect an underlying 
arithmetic relationship.  
We need to interpret the non-monotonic relationship in column 3 of Table 3 carefully. 
Given the magnitude of the coefficient estimates, the maximal impact of NUMBER OF LINES 
on acquiring EXISTING LINES is at 40 lines. Although the maximum occurs well within the 
empirical range of the values of acquirers’ NUMBER OF LINES (56 lines), only four percent of 
the observations have values above 40 lines. For this reason, we hesitate to draw inferences 
regarding the portion of the curve after the maximum. In practice, the net effect of NUMBER OF 
LINES on the dependent variable remains positive, yet decreasing, within the observable range. 
Its value is 0.11 for a firm with one product line, 1.82 at the maximum, and 0.56 for a firm with 
56 product lines. Therefore, we emphasize the positive, yet decreasing marginal effect of 
NUMBER OF LINES. This pattern is consistent with the argument that firms reach limits in 
their ability to use integration capabilities intensively. 
Two size-related control variables in column 3 have significant influences on product line 
overlap. The larger the acquirer (SIZE), the less likely it was to acquire existing lines. By 
contrast, the larger the target (TARGET SIZE), the greater the likelihood of overlap. These 
results suggest that existing-line acquisitions decline with acquirer size, possibly because larger 
firms have greater ability to generate similar new resources internally. 
We also find that PREVIOUS ACQUISITIONS has a negative and significant effect on 
EXISTING LINES.  In sensitivity analysis, we found that the number of acquisitions that a firm 
made within the sample period drives this effect. That is, if this variable is not updated from its 
value at the beginning of the sample period, so that it reflects only historical acquisitions, the  22
effect of previous acquisitions is non-significant. Thus, the influence of previous acquisitions 
derives from a firm’s recent experience, rather than longer-term history. That is, the more 
acquisitions that firms have made in the recent past, the less likely they are to make acquisitions 
that overlap with their existing operations. The negative impact of previous recent acquisitions 
again is consistent with firms reaching a limit in their ability to use integration capabilities 
intensively, at least within a moderate period of time. 
Finally, we observe a negative and significant coefficient for the selection correction in 
column 3 of Table 3. This suggests a negative and significant correlation between the error in 
this equation and the probit model. That is, there exists some unmeasured effect that increases 
the likelihood of a firm becoming an acquirer and decreases the number of existing lines that a 
firm purchases. Again, the sample selection approach mitigates the possibility that our variables 
actually capture some unmeasured effect rather than the influences that we want to address. 
As a whole, the results in Table 3 lead to the following interpretations. First, the lack of 
significance of the independent variables in columns 1 and 2 suggests an overall tendency for all 
acquirers to purchase product lines that they did not previously operate, as evidenced by the sign 
and magnitude of the intercept and by the mean values of the dependent variables. The high 
correlation between these two dependent variables provides further evidence of this conclusion. 
Moreover, the tendency to purchase product lines that firms did not previously operate does not 
systematically vary with the independent variables that we include in the specification, which 
include product line scope, nationality, size, and growth in the underlying product line. 
Therefore, acquirers with many characteristics commonly use acquisitions to extend their 
product lines. 
Second, a more detailed examination of acquisition activity suggests that firms with 
greater product line scope are more systematic in making acquisitions that tie into their existing 
lines of business. The results when EXISTING LINES is the dependent variable (column 3) 
provide this implication. This relationship does not show up when NET OVERLAP is the 
dependent variable (column 1) because buying new product lines is so prevalent in all firms’ 
acquisitions. Instead, the result appears only when we disaggregate the new and existing product 
lines. Therefore, although all acquirers tend to purchase product lines that they did not operate ex 
ante, acquirers with more product lines are more systematic in making acquisitions that add to 
their existing lines. This tendency increases with product line scope but it does so at a decreasing  23
rate, which suggests that integration capability affects product line choice but the marginal 
impact of higher integration capability levels is smaller than lower capability levels. 
In summary, we find contrasting acquisition tendencies for firms with differing product 
line scope. Acquirers with greater product line scope tend to purchase product lines that both 
extend and overlap their previous product offerings. By contrast, firms with smaller product line 
scope primarily tend to purchase product lines that extend their previous product offerings. 
Therefore, it appears that firms with fewer product lines emphasize acquisitions that graft new 
businesses onto the existing organization. Firms with larger product line offerings also graft on 
new activities but, in addition, may acquire greater scale for their current businesses. 
Given the pattern of results that we observe, coupled with the implications of other 
research, we believe that the results are consistent with the integration capabilities argument that 
underlies the hypotheses. In particular, it appears that firms with greater integration capabilities 
pick targets that suit their capabilities.  
The interpretation that integration capability affects what product lines a firm acquires is 
consistent with other research. Popular teaching cases on corporate strategy (e.g., Cooper 
Industries and Newell) highlight how companies that are adept at acquiring and continually 
integrating business are very systematic in the business that they acquire – especially with 
respect to how these businesses overlap with the existing corporation (Collis and Stewart, 1991; 
Collis and Johnson, 1994). In addition, the corporate finance literature has focused on how target 
choice is an indicator for acquirer characteristics. For example, Morck, Schleifer and Vishney 
(1990) argue that unrelated acquisitions reflect agency behavior. Our interpretation parallels this 
argument, in that we find that firms with greater integration capabilities are more likely to 
undertake acquisitions that tie directly to their existing businesses. We do not conclude, though, 
that acquisitions of new lines by firms with fewer integration capabilities necessarily reflect 
agency behavior. Instead, the firms might simply believe that the acquisitions represent their 
most feasible expansion alternatives, despite expected difficulties in post-acquisition integration. 
Finally, we reiterate that the research we cited earlier is consistent with the interpretation that 
product line scope associates with integration capabilities.  
Alternative explanations: 
We consider and, where possible, test several possible alternative explanations of the 
results. First, as we discussed earlier, we do not believe that an underlying arithmetic relationship  24
drive the pattern of results with respect to whether acquirers purchase product lines that they 
previously operated. Both the non-linearity of the impact of NUMBER OF LINES in column 3 
of Table 3 and the null results in column 2 are inconsistent with an arithmetic explanation. 
A second alternative explanation is that product line scope captures firm size rather than 
integration capabilities. There are two reasons why we do not believe this to be the case. First, 
we include controls for size in all specifications. Second, if size alone affected the propensity to 
acquire, we would also expect the probabilistic arguments of the relationship between product 
line scope and whether or not the firm acquired new lines of business to hold, because increased 
size would affect the probability of overlap. It does not.  
A third explanation that initially appealed to us was that firms with more product lines 
might tend to acquire targets with more product lines. If so, then, there would be greater chance 
of overlap. To examine this possibility, we created the dependent variable TARGET LINES (i.e., 
NEW LINES + EXISTING LINES) and regressed it on NUMBER OF LINES, but found no 
evidence of such a pattern.  
Fourth, there is the possibility that a firm’s NUMBER OF LINES measures acquisition 
capability rather than integration capability. To aid in ruling out this interpretation, we included 
direct measures of acquisition history or capability (e.g., PREVIOUS ACQUISITIONS and 
ENTER BY ACQUISITION). These variables often show significant effects in the tables in the 
way that would be expected. For example, PREVIOUS ACQUISITIONS positively affects the 
likelihood that a firm is an acquirer in the sample period. Therefore, we are more confident that 
NUMBER OF LINES captures integration capabilities rather than acquisition momentum or 
capabilities. 
Fifth, our arguments stem from the notion that firms enter acquisitions with the 
expectation of improving firm performance. However, there is the possibility that product line 
scope captures other underlying motivations rather than integration capabilities. One such 
possibility is that firms make acquisitions for reasons independent of expected profitability, so 
that the relationship between product line scope and the dependent variables is spurious. There 
are two factors that we believe mitigate this argument. First, the strength of the product line 
results in the probit estimation makes it unlikely to be spurious. Second, the results in the 
estimation of product line overlap do not appear spurious (i.e., driven by a probabilistic 
relationship), as we discussed.   25
Sixth, building on the notion of other motivations, we considered that possibility that 
greater product line scope reflects empire-building agency behavior rather than integration 
capability. If product line scope measures agency behavior and agency motivations were 
prevalent in the sample, this would be consistent with the probit results concerning acquisition 
likelihood (Table 2). However, the finding that firms with greater product line scope 
systematically make acquisitions that tied more into their existing businesses (Table 3) is not 
consistent with agency arguments. This is because some arguments expect such agency-
motivated acquisitions to focus on expansion into unrelated areas (e.g., Amihud and Lev, 1981; 
Morck, Schleifer and Vishney, 1990; for an alternative view, see also Lane, Cannella, and 
Lubatkin, 1998). We find no relationship between the number of product lines and the tendency 
to purchase new product lines and, moreover, do find evidence that firms with more product 
lines make acquisitions that better tie into their existing operations. 
Finally, the issue of antitrust enforcement arises as a potential influence on the results, if 
U.S. regulatory authorities inhibited the types of acquisitions that firms could undertake within a 
market sector. However, such an effect would be most likely to take the opposite direction to that 
which we found. That is, antitrust authorities would be most restrictive about acquisitions with 
over-lapping product lines when they involved acquirers with greater numbers of lines. At the 
same time, though, antitrust enforcement might contribute to the general pattern that all acquirers 
tend to target product lines that they do not already operate. 
In summary, we find systematic patterns that support the hypothesis 1 and provide 
refined support for hypothesis 2. Firms with greater product line scope are more likely to become 
acquirers. We also find that firms in our sample most often use acquisitions to purchase product 
lines that they do not currently operate, and that the propensity to do so does not vary by product 
line scope, nationality, or firm size. Firms with greater product line scope, while exhibiting this 
tendency to acquire product lines they did not operate ex ante, also are more likely to make such 
acquisitions that tie into their existing product lines. This pattern of firm choices in acquisition 
activities implies that firms with greater integration capabilities, as measured by product line 
scope, have greater incentive to undertake acquisitions and, moreover, may be better able to 
undertake the intense integration required to gain economies of scale in existing product lines. At 
the same time, non-linearities in the results suggest that firms reach limits in their ability to use 
integration capabilities intensively.  26
CONCLUSION 
Our contribution in this paper is the systematic analysis of which firms become acquirers 
and, contingent upon becoming an acquirer, what factors influence whether a firm purchases 
product lines it did or did not previously offer. We expected that firms with greater integration 
capability, as measured by product line scope, are more likely to become acquirers. We also 
examine whether they are more likely to purchase product lines that they did or did not operate.  
The results support our hypothesis concerning acquisition likelihood. We find that firms 
with greater product line scope were more likely to be acquirers. Because of the nature of our 
sample, the pattern of results, and the control variables that we include, we believe that this 
relationship captures differences in ongoing integration capabilities. 
With respect to whether or not acquirers purchased lines of business that they previously 
operated, we also find a systematic pattern. We find that with each acquisition companies, on 
average, acquired about 2.3 product lines in which they did not previously operate, whereas they 
acquired only about 1 line that they already operated. Thus, acquirers more commonly used 
acquisitions to extend into new product areas, rather than to reinforce existing lines. In addition, 
we found that acquirers with greater product lines scope were the most likely to use acquisitions 
to purchase product lines in which they already participated. This is consistent with the 
interpretation that firms with greater integration capabilities are systematic in the firms that they 
acquire, as well as being more likely to be acquirers.  
We believe that the study generalizes to many settings of moderately-related 
diversification within a market sector. The results suggest that acquisitions provide a means by 
which firms can expand the range of their offerings across technical and customer segments of a 
market, but it is mainly firms that have developed substantial integration capabilities that are able 
to employ the acquisition mechanism for expansion. By contrast, firms with limited integration 
capabilities are more likely to expand internally, if they expand at all, and only reach the ability 
to employ acquisitions once they have built an internal base of integration capabilities. Thus, the 
study helps us assess the underlying selection processes that occur with respect to acquisitions.  
Moreover, although we do not examine acquisition performance in this study, the 
selection processes that we highlight suggest implications for understanding acquisition 
performance. First, examining which firms undertake acquisitions might help explain the great 
heterogeneity of acquisition outcomes that shows up in practice. In particular, it is possible that  27
poor acquisition outcomes commonly arise when firms that lack integration capabilities 
undertake acquisitions despite the lack of skill.  
Second, our findings regarding which firms acquire lines of business that they operate ex 
ante might help account for observed differences in the performance outcomes of “related” 
versus “unrelated” acquisitions, if we view acquisition of existing lines as a refined form of 
related acquisition. Rumelt (1974) and several subsequent studies sometimes find that 
acquisitions that relate to a firm’s existing capabilities often outperform acquisitions that 
primarily involve new capabilities (Palich, Cardinal, and Miller, 2000). This result might arise if 
firms with stronger integration capabilities are systematically more likely to undertake more 
related acquisitions than firms with weaker integration capabilities, as we find here. If so, then 
the stronger performance of related acquisitions would flow more from the firms’ underlying 
capabilities than from the relatedness per se. 
Indeed, this suggestion speaks to the ambiguity in the findings concerning the relative 
performance of related and unrelated acquisitions. Although some studies report positive 
relationships between acquisition performance and relatedness (e.g., Singh and Montgomery, 
1987; Shelton, 1988; Anand and Singh, 1997), several others report no main effect of relatedness 
on performance (e.g., Stillman, 1983; Eckbo, 1983; Chatterjee, 1986; You et al., 1986; Lubatkin, 
1987; Fowler and Schmidt, 1989; Sirower, 1997). In reconciling this finding, part of the 
discourse in the literature has focused on the differences in measuring related versus unrelated 
expansion (e.g. Palich, Cardinal, and Miller, 2000). Our findings suggest another possible 
interpretation. Relatedness reflects internal firm capabilities to integrate business activities as 
much or more as it reflects external measures based on product-markets, such as SIC-based 
measures (i.e., there is a firm-specific selection effect of relatedness, rather than a more general 
market-level effect). To the extent that studies directly or indirectly control for firms’ integration 
capabilities, externally-defined relatedness might well exhibit no significant relationship with 
acquisition performance. Although conclusive evidence that selection drives the results is beyond 
the scope of this study, the implication provides fruitful ground for future research. 
One last set of findings concerning foreign-based firms deserves comment. The finding 
that foreign firms are more likely to be acquirers, even controlling for integration capability, is 
consistent with research that argues that foreign firms often make acquisitions to acquire foreign-
based capabilities (e.g., Kogut and Chang, 1991). In parallel, though, we find that foreign-owned  28
firms purchase product lines that they did not operate at the same rate as U.S.-owned firms. This 
result is interesting in light of recent discussion concerning asset-seeking foreign expansion in 
the international business literature. The result suggests that purchasing capabilities that 
acquirers do not possess is as common in domestic acquisitions as in cross-border acquisitions. 
Thus, both domestic and foreign-based firms appear to use acquisitions as asset-seeking 
strategies. 
In conclusion, our findings highlight the existence of selection processes by which profit-
seeking firms choose to undertake acquisitions and choose to acquire product lines that they did 
or did not previously operate. We focus on an element of selection process (i.e., integration 
capability as measured by product line scope) that varies in most industry settings. Obtaining 
insight into acquisition selection processes is key to understanding acquisition strategies. 
Because we demonstrate that certain firms undertake acquisitions, assessing acquisition strategy 
choice of overlap of existing and acquired businesses requires the insight that firms with certain 
characteristics are most likely to undertake acquisitions. Moreover, the nature of the acquisitions 
reflects the attributes of the companies.    29
ENDNOTES 
                                                           
1 Business-level acquisitions are acquisitions either by single-business companies or by sector-specific 
business units of multi-business firms. That is, we focus on acquisitions that take place within a single 
market sector (empirically, in our case, the medical sector), by single business firms and by multiple-
business firms, rather than consider all acquisitions by firms that operate in multiple business sectors. 
2 Acquiring product lines with no attempt at integration will create little value; we discuss our 
assumptions regarding such agency behavior below. 
3 In the medical sector setting of our study, for instance, different medical specialists (i.e., customers in 
different market segments, such as radiology and obstetrics) often purchase different products from 
different sales channels, even if the products draw on similar technologies. Hence, different product lines 
often require different marketing resources. 
4 Karim and Mitchell (2000) examined whether product line overlap at acquirers and targets (independent 
variables) affected post-acquisition product line retention (outcome). By contrast, this paper asks why the 
acquisitions occurred in the first place (outcome one) and why there was a particular degree of overlap 
(outcome two). Understanding the causes of strategy choice, which this study addresses, aid in 
understanding subsequent firm performance and in prescribing recommended actions.  
5 When coding the values of the independent variables associated with ACQUIRER, we use the values at 
the point the firm enters the sample, to restrict the sample to one observation per firm. This helps assure 
that we have independence across observations, which is an assumption of the multivariate technique that 
we employ. When coding the values of the covariates associated with NET OVERLAP, we use the values 
at the year prior to the acquisition. This provides an estimate of firm characteristics before the acquisition. 
It is for this reason that the maximum value for NUMBER OF LINES is 43 in the data where we examine 
ACQUIRER, and 56 in the data the we examine NET OVERLAP; the firm with 43 lines at the time it 
entered the sample grew to 56 lines before it made an acquisition later in the sample period. 
6 Medical sector sales correlated highly with total corporate sales when data were available. Due to the 
extensive coverage of private firms in the data set, we were unable to gather total sales data for many 
firms. The descriptive statistics in Table 1 reveal that we assign some companies zero values for sales. In 
most cases, zero sales reflect that a company exists with a product line but with sales levels that are so 
low that the data sources do not record the sales. In a few cases, zero sales represent companies that have 
products that are awaiting regulatory approval and have not yet recorded sales. 
7 We update the PREVIOUS ACQUISITIONS variable if firms made multiple acquisitions within our 
sample period when we assess line overlap as the dependent variable.  
8 Ideally, we would measure change in total product line sales in the market, but data do not exist at that 
level of disaggregation. The growth in the number of firms is a reasonable alternative measure of whether 
a product area is growing or declining. 
9 The dependent variables are counts, so that count regression models might provide more efficient 
estimates, but least-squares estimates are unbiased and the error term corrects for heteroskedasticity that 
can stem from count dependent variables. We also used an approximation of the Poisson model for 
sample selection suggested by Greene (1995), finding results that are consistent with those presented.  30
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Table 1. Correlation Matrices and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Acquisition tendency (n=2589)  12345678
1.  ACQUIRER  1.00       
2. NUMBER OF LINES  0.34 1.00      
3. SIZE  0.19 0.24 1.00     
4. ENTER BY ACQUISITION  0.16 0.09 0.05 1.00    
5. PREVIOUS ACQUISITIONS  0.38 0.67 0.21 0.14 1.00   
6. FOREIGN  0.05 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 1.00  
7. COMPETITORS  0.01 -0.05 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 1.00 
8. PRODUCT LINE GROWTH  0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.06 1.00
 
Mean 0.08 2.25 7.74E+04 0.03 0.48 0.08 52.02 2.72
Std. dev.  0.28 2.80 5.44E+05 0.17 1.62 0.27 39.84 4.49
Min. 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 -0.75
Max 1.00 43.00 1.39E+07 1.00 25.00 1.00 182.00 26.00
 
Acquired Lines (n=271)  1 2 3 4567  89 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3
1 .   N E T   O V E R L A P   1 . 0 0             
2. EXISTING LINES  -0.06 1.00           
3. NEW LINES  -0.92 0.45 1.00          
4. NUMBER OF LINES  0.07 0.27 0.04 1.00         
5. NUMBER OF LINES
2  0.06 0.19 0.02 0.93 1.00        
6. FOREIGN  0.05 -0.08 -0.08 -0.15 -0.13 1.00       
7. SIZE  -0.03 -0.08 0.00 0.17 0.12 -0.13 1.00       
8. TARGET - DOMESTIC  -0.02 0.03 0.03 0.17 0.13 -0.40 0.12 1.00     
9. TARGET – SIZE  0.06 0.29 0.06 0.22 0.17 -0.16 0.45 0.00 1.00    
10. COMPETITORS  0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.14 -0.12 0.30 -0.07 -0.19 0.00 1.00   
11. PRDT LINE GROWTH  -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.14 0.02 0.11 0.03 -0.15 1.00  
12. PREV ACQUISITIONS  0.01 0.08 0.03 0.66 0.61 -0.15 0.20 0.21 0.18 -0.05 -0.10 1.00 
13. ENTER BY ACQ  0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.11 0.13 0.12 0.04 0.09 -0.01 0.08 1.00
               
Mean -1.47 0.86 2.32 9.61 206.48 0.21 2.6E+05  0.88 6.3E+05 56.41 2.81 4.45 0.10
Std. dev.  3.34 1.45 3.72 10.71 468.86 0.41 7.1E+05  0.32 1.3E+06 35.26 3.36 5.19 0.30
Min. -24.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 8.00 -0.44 0.00 0.00
Max 5.00 13.00 28.00 56.00 3136.00 1.00 6.9E+06  1.00 1.4E+07 182.00 20.20 27.00 1.00 34
Table 2. Probit Results – Influence of Product Line Scope on the Likelihood that a Firm 
Becomes an Acquirer, 1978/1983 – 1995  
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
[marginal effects evaluated at the mean level of the independent variables in square brackets] 
Positive coefficient estimates indicate increased probability of being an acquirer. 
 
Constant -1.55*** 
(11.30) 
[-0.16] 
NUMBER OF LINES  0.07*** 
(4.17)  
[0.01] 
SIZE 1.67x10
-7*** 
(3.13)  
[1.77x10
-8] 
ENTER THE SECTOR BY ACQUISITION  0.82*** 
(5.05)  
[0.15] 
PREVIOUS ACQUISITIONS  0.21*** 
(7.49) 
[0.02] 
FOREIGN 0.36*** 
(2.97)  
[0.05] 
COMPETITORS 0.001 
(1.10)  
[0.00] 
PRODUCT LINE GROWTH  0.00 
(0.52)  
[0.00] 
  
χ
2(d.f.)  285.37 (7)*** 
Pseudo R
2 0.19 
 
*** p <0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 (one tailed tests) 
 
n = 2,589 (number of observations where dependent variable = 1 is 216). 
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Table 3. Regression Results – Influences On Overlap Of Acquired Product Lines with the 
Acquirer’s Existing Lines 
(t-statistics in parentheses; n=271) 
 
 1.  NET 
OVERLAP 
 
2. NEW LINES 
 
 
3. EXISTING LINES
 
 
Constant -2.01 
(1.19) 
3.24** 
(1.71) 
1.23 
(0.68) 
NUMBER OF LINES  0.05 
(0.81) 
0.04 
(0.61) 
0.09*** 
(3.57) 
NUMBER OF LINES
2 -0.00 
(0.81) 
-0.001 
(0.60) 
-0.001** 
(2.12) 
FOREIGN 0.53 
(0.35) 
-0.62 
(0.33) 
-0.09 
(0.68) 
SIZE -3.21x10
-7 
(0.33) 
-3.09x10
-7 
(0.40) 
-6.29x10
-7*** 
(4.89) 
TARGET - DOMESTIC  0.02 
(0.98) 
0.15 
(0.85) 
-0.04 
(0.53) 
TARGET – SIZE  2.51x10
-7 
(0.22) 
0.87x10
-7 
(0.70) 
3.39x10
-7*** 
(4.18) 
COMPETITORS 0.00 
(0.68) 
-0.00 
(0.67) 
-0.00 
(0.88) 
PRODUCT LINE GROWTH  0.00 
(0.95) 
0.00 
(1.00) 
-0.00 
(0.87) 
PREVIOUS 
ACQUISITIONS 
-0.02 
(0.86) 
-0.09 
(0.38) 
-0.11*** 
(2.93) 
ENTER THE SECTOR BY 
ACQUISITION 
0.52 
(0.51) 
-0.68 
(0.44) 
-0.16 
(0.52) 
λ  (Selection effect)  0.26 
(0.73) 
-0.84 
(0.32) 
-0.59** 
(1.99) 
      
R
2 0.02  0.02  0.25 
F (11, 259)  0.48  0.47  8.00*** 
 
*** p <0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 (one tailed tests) 
 
Note: “NET OVERLAP” = “EXISTING LINES” – “NEW LINES”  36
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